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Abstract   This paper examines whether Australian electricity spot prices follow a random walk. Daily peak 
and off-peak (base load) prices for New South Wales, Victoria, Queensland and South Australia 
are sampled over the period July 1999 to June 2001 and analysed using multiple variance ratio 
tests. The results indicate that the null hypothesis of a random walk can be rejected in all peak 
period and most off-period markets because of the autocorrelation of returns. For the Victorian 
market, the off-peak period electricity spot price follows a random walk. One implication of the 
study is that in most instances, stochastic autoregressive modelling techniques may be adequate 
for forecasting electricity prices. 
Introduction 
Over the last two decades an increasing number of developed and developing economies 
around the world have restructured their electricity markets. Starting with Chile, Argentina 
and the United Kingdom, and followed by the United States and most members of the 
European Union, these efforts have entailed a move away from the heavily-regulated publicly 
or privately-owned, vertically-integrated utilities of the past towards more market-based 
structures for electricity suppliers in the present and potentially more competitive outcomes 
for consumers in the future (Crow 2002).  
In the past ten years Australia has also been at the forefront of these efforts to introduce 
competition into the global power industry. Where electricity was once supplied by state 
government-owned entities that had never operated on a national or even a regional basis, and 
where interstate connections were weak and regional electricity trade limited, the market is 
now characterised by the separation of the generation, transmission and distribution functions 
by company, and by a competitive national electricity market across the majority of 
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Australian states and territories. And for the most part, the restructuring and liberalisation of 
the Australian electricity market has been a success. In evidence, the benefits to the economy 
of electricity market liberalisation amounted to $1.5 billion in 2000 alone, labour productivity 
in the electricity supply industry doubled in the last decade while capital productivity 
increased by ten percent, and average retail electricity prices are now more than ten percent 
below the levels of the early 1990s (ABARE 2002). 
However, in recent years the pace of electricity reform in Australia has slowed. The target 
dates for full retail competition have been delayed and each of the five National Electricity 
Market (NEM) members: namely, New South Wales (NSW), Victoria (VIC), Queensland 
(QLD), South Australia (SA) and the Australian Capital Territory (ACT) are still 
characterised by separate transmission companies. Full privatisation has occurred only in 
Victoria. In South Australia private companies manage the state-owned generation, 
transmission and distribution companies under long-term leases; in the remaining states and 
territories they remain in government ownership. The dominance of the individual generating 
companies in each market is also high with the two largest generators accounting for seventy 
percent of generation in NSW, and in most other states and territories at least fifty percent. 
The NEM itself is not yet strongly integrated with interstate trade representing only some 
seven percent of total generation. During periods of peak demand, the interconnectors can 
become congested and the NEM separates into its regions, promoting price differences across 
markets and exacerbating reliability problems and the market power of regional utilities. 
Ongoing challenges remain in implementing efficient transmission pricing with a view to 
strengthening interconnection as a check on regional market power and extending retail 
access to all consumers.  
Nevertheless, overriding the electricity reform process in Australia has been the ongoing 
objective that “…the electricity market should be competitive” such that cost of consuming 
the delivered electricity is as low as economically feasible, but is still sufficient to induce 
investment in new capacity. In the short run, the market regulations are constructed in such a 
way that the most efficient generators are dispatched to meet a given level of electricity 
demand. The lowest market price provided ensures that all generators are at least 
compensated for any short run marginal costs incurred (ABARE 2002). In the longer run, it is 
expected that efficient markets will signal a return on investment, through higher prices, that 
is sufficient to induce further capacity expansion. Competitive investment would then result 
in additions to generation capacity in such a way that the average cost of meeting electricity 
demand requirements over time was minimised (ABARE 2002). Accordingly, the benchmark 
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for efficiency within the national electricity market is competitive market outcomes. By 
measuring the extent to which actual market prices exceed the prices that would occur in a 
competitive market, some assessment of the efficiency of pricing is obtained. 
Yet the ability of these newly competitive electricity markets to play the role that is 
ascribed to them depends not only on their efficiency in an economic sense but also on their 
efficiency in the market sense. If they are to help improve the operation of the electricity 
market itself in the shorter term, and the capital market in the longer term, then the price 
formation process is crucial. And more often than not, an assessment of price formation is 
couched in terms of ‘market efficiency’. Under this efficient market hypothesis prices are 
rationally related to economic realities and incorporate all the information available to the 
market. In such a market price changes should be serially random (or follow a random walk) 
and the absence of exploitable excess or abnormal profit opportunities implies that electricity 
is appropriately priced at its equilibrium level. Such information is also important because it 
determines the statistical assumptions that underlie price forecasts in these markets.    
Of course, there are any number of reasons to believe that competitive outcomes in 
electricity markets are associated with random (or non-serially correlated) prices changes 
while non-competitive outcomes are associated with non-random (or serially correlated) price 
changes. In a competitive electricity market, prices are inherently volatile as demand varies 
widely both within a day or week and across seasons within a year. Electricity consumption is 
difficult to predict and the lack of real-time pricing means demand is not very responsive to 
price changes. Further, the ability to quickly increase production beyond installed capacity is 
limited, and the high cost of idle capacity and the lack of economical storage, along with the 
fact that demand and supply must be continuously balanced to meet certain physical supply 
quality requirements (frequency, voltage and stability) together imply that prices reflect the 
underlying volatility in the cost of supplying electricity (ABARE 2002). This would suggest 
that electricity spot prices should at least approximate a random walk.  
However, in a non-competitive environment there is every reason to expect that efforts by 
generation businesses to exercise market power by withholding capacity or by raising prices 
at which they are willing to supply electricity above their short run marginal cost will be 
reflected in sustained price increases. For example, the withholding of capacity by generators 
in California contributed to significant price increases in 2000/01 (Joskow and Kahn 2001) 
while Robinson and Baniak (2002) found generators in the English and Welsh Electricity 
Pool had an incentive to raise prices and manipulate volatility in order to benefit from higher 
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risk premia in the contract market. Wolfram (1999) likewise examined the impact of duopoly 
power in the British electricity market.        
In this paper an attempt is made to examine the informational efficiency of the four state-
based regional electricity markets that comprise the Australian National Electricity Market by 
testing for random walks in the wholesale electricity prices. The paper itself is divided into 
five main areas. The first section briefly surveys the establishment and operation of the 
Australian National Electricity Market. The second section provides a description of the data 
employed in the analysis, while the third section discusses the methodology employed. The 
results are dealt with in the fourth section. The paper ends with a brief conclusion in the final 
section. 
 
Australian electricity markets 
The Australian National Electricity Market (NEM) encompasses electricity generators in the 
eastern state electricity markets of Australia operating as a nationally interconnected grid. The 
member jurisdictions of the NEM thus include the three most populous states of New South 
Wales (NSW) [including the Australian Capital Territory (ACT)], Victoria (VIC) and 
Queensland (QLD) along with South Australia (SA). The only non-state based member that 
currently provides output into the NEM is the Snowy Mountains Hydroelectric Scheme 
(SNO). The SNO is regarded as a special case owing to the complexity of arrangements 
underlying both its original construction and operating arrangements involving both the state 
governments of New South Wales and Victoria, as well as the Commonwealth (federal) 
government. It is intended that the island state of Tasmania will become a member of the 
NEM pending completion of the Basslink interconnector, which will link Tasmania’s 
Electricity Supply Industry with that of the mainland. The remaining Australian state of 
Western Australia along with the Northern Territory is unlikely to participate in the NEM in 
the foreseeable future due to the economic and physical unfeasibility of interconnection and 
transmission augmentation across such geographically dispersed and distant areas.  
The limitations of transfer capability within the centrally coordinated and regulated NEM 
are indeed one of its defining features. Queensland has two interconnectors that together can 
import and export 880 megawatts (MW) to and from NSW, NSW can export 850 MW to the 
Snowy and 3000 MW from the Snowy and Victoria can import 1500 MW from the Snowy 
and 250 MW from South Australia and export 1100 MW to the Snowy and 500 MW to South 
Australia. There is currently no direct connector between NSW and South Australia and 
Queensland is only connected directly to NSW. 
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The NEM was developed and operates under a number of legislative agreements, 
memorandums of understanding and protocols between the participating jurisdictions. They 
include a mechanism for uniformity of relevant electricity legislation across states, 
implementation of the National Electricity Code (NEC) and the creation of the National 
Electricity Code Administrator (NECA) and the National Electricity Market Management 
Company (NEMMCO) to control and implement the NEM. The NECA is the organisation 
charged with administering the NEC. This entails monitoring participant compliance with the 
Code and raising Code breaches with the National Electricity Tribunal (IEA: 2001: 132). 
Other roles of the NECA include managing changes to the NEC and establishing procedures 
for dispute resolution, consultative, and reporting procedures (NEMMCO 2001: 28). The 
NECA also established the Reliability Panel in 1997, in order to “determine power system 
security and reliability standards, and monitor market reliability” (IEA: 2001: 132). 
The market rules that govern the operation of the NEM are embedded in the NEC, which 
was developed in consultation with government, industry and consumers during the mid-
1990s. NEMMCO (2001: 4) summarises the rationale for the thoroughness of the NEC: 
The rules and standards of the Code ensure that all parties seeking to be part of the 
electricity network should have access on a fair and reasonable basis. The Code 
also defines technical requirements for the electricity networks, generator plant, 
and customer connection equipment to ensure that electricity delivered to the 
customers meets prescribed standards.   
The NEC required authorisation by the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission 
(ACCC) to be implemented, as do any changes. Born from the Hilmer microeconomic 
reforms in the 1990s the ACCC is the peak Australian body aimed at enforcing competition 
law. To this affect, the ACCC is responsible for administering the Trade Practices Act (1974), 
which was augmented under the National Competition Policy (NCP) reforms to facilitate 
access arrangements to network infrastructure and the addition of competitive neutrality 
provisions, which ensure there can be no discrimination between public and private service 
providers. Asher (1998: 10) highlights the key change to the Trade Practices Act (1974) under 
the National Competition Policy reforms as “establishing a third party access regime to cover 
the services provided by significant infrastructure facilities” (facilities not economically 
feasible to duplicate and where the access arrangements would be necessary to promote 
effective competition in upstream or downstream markets). In addition to the administration 
of this role in regard to market infrastructure, the ACCC is the organisation responsible for 
the regulation of the transmission network component of the Australian Electricity Supply 
Industry. Of the various facets this role encompasses, transmission pricing is the most 
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prominent. This is managed by the ACCC on a revenue cap basis, in an attempt “to constrain 
monopoly pricing while allowing the business owners a rate of return sufficient to fund 
network operation and expansion” (ACCC 2000: 8). In brief, the ACCC’s price cap 
methodology is (IEA 2001: 137): 
The revenue of transmission companies is regulated on the basis of an adjusted 
replacement value of the assets, known as deprival value, and its weighted cost of 
capital. The maximum annual revenue allowed to transmission is subject to a 
“CPI-X” price cap, fixed for a period of at least five years, that reduces 
transmission charges over time in real terms.  
 The transmission-pricing role is carried out in conjunction with a service reliability protocol, 
to ensure quality of service. As noted, changes to the NEC effecting transmission or any other 
aspect of the market must be authorised by the ACCC. As such the ACCC is responsible for 
the evaluation of changes to market operations. It is the role of the National Electricity Market 
Management Company (NEMMCO) to implement and administer changes to market 
operation. 
The National Electricity Market Management Company (NEMMCO) operates the 
wholesale market for electricity trade between generators and retailers (and also large 
consumers). From an operational perspective, output from generators is pooled then scheduled 
to meet demand. The IEA (2001: 134) summarises the core elements as follows: 
The National Electricity Market is a mandatory auction in which generators of 30 
MW [megawatts] or more and wholesale market customers compete. Generators 
submit bids consisting of simple price-quantity pairs specifying the amount of 
energy they are prepared to supply at a certain price. Up to ten such pairs can be 
submitted per day. In principle, these bids are firm and can only be altered under 
certain conditions. Generator bids are used to construct a merit order of 
generation. Customer bids are used to construct a demand schedule. Dispatch 
minimises the cost of meeting the actual electricity demand, taking into account 
transmission constraints for each of the five regions in which the market is 
divided…There are no capacity payments or any other capacity mechanisms.  
The two key aspects required for the pool to operate are a centrally coordinated dispatch 
mechanism and operation of the ‘spot market’ process. As the market operator, NEMMCO 
coordinates dispatch to “balance electricity supply and demand requirements” (NEMMCO, 
2001: 3), which is required because of the instantaneous nature of electricity, and the spot 
price is then “the clearing price [that] matches supply with demand” (NEMMCO 2001: 3). 
The pool rules dictate that generators in the NEM with a capacity greater than 30MW are 
required to submit bidding schedules (prices for supplying different levels of generation) to 
NEMMCO on a day before basis. Separate capacity schedules are submitted for each of the 
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48 half-hour periods of the day. As a result, the industry supply curve (also called a bid stack) 
may be segmented to a maximum extent of ten times the number of generators bidding into 
the pool. NEMMCO determines prices every five minutes on a real time basis. This is 
achieved by matching expected demand in the next five minutes against the bid stack for that 
half-hour period. The price offered by the last generator to be dispatched (plant are dispatched 
on a least-cost basis) to meet total demand sets the five-minute price. The price for the half-
hour trading period (or pool price) is the time-weighted average of the six five-minute periods 
comprising the half-hour trading period. This is the price generators receive for the actual 
electricity they dispatch into the pool, and is the price market customers pay to receive 
generation in that half hour period. 
<TABLE 1 HERE> 
An illustration of spot market pricing in the NEM is drawn from NEMMCO (2001 12). 
Table 1 contains offer prices for six generators (in megawatt hours) and demand information 
(in megawatts) for the six five-minute dispatch periods in the 12:30 trading interval. 
Assuming each of these generators has 100 MW (megawatts) of capacity, Figure 1 
graphically analyses the least cost dispatch for these five-minute intervals. For example, at 
12:05 total demand is 290 MW and to meet this demand the full capacity of the lowest priced 
generators 1 ($32 MWh) and 2 ($33 MWh) and most of the capacity of generator 3 ($35 
MWh) is required.  The marginal price for this five-minute interval is then $35 MWh. This 
information, along with the remaining five-minute intervals until 12:30, is tabulated in Table 
2, which shows the marginal price for each five-minute interval as a result of the plant 
dispatch mix, which is primarily dependant on the level of demand. The pool price for the 
12:30 trading interval is the average of these six five-minute marginal prices.  
<TABLE 2 HERE> 
The spot pricing procedure, while bringing balance between supply and demand, can 
expose participants to significant variation. This is owing to the dependence of the pool 
process on generator bidding strategies [for instance, Brennan et al. (1998) highlight the 
potential for holders of large generating portfolios to bid non-competitively in order to 
exercise market power] and the impact of the complex interaction of supply and demand 
factors on pricing. As such the spot price can be volatile, leading to large financial exposure. 
The occurrence of various phenomenon in the NEM have seen instances of high spot prices, 
and in some cases the maximum price cap for the NEM (Value of Lost Load) has been 
triggered.  
<FIGURE 1 HERE> 
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Events in the past, which have had a tendency to drive NEM prices toward the upper end 
of the price spectrum, are of three types. First, prices can increase dramatically when a 
generation plant ‘trips’ or ‘falls over’, rendering it inoperable and forcing the plant’s 
contributed capacity to be removed from the bid stack. This is particularly the case if the plant 
provides base load output. Secondly, abnormal environmental temperatures drive demand up 
as customers increase demand for cooling or heating technology. Higher demand requires 
more generation to balance the system, which means plants bidding in at a higher price level 
on the least-cost merit order are sequentially dispatched to meet the additional demand. Third, 
technical constraints or faults with the systems design can also lead to higher prices. These 
three instances combined to cause an electricity supply crisis for Victoria in February 2000, as 
profiled by the IEA (2001: 123): 
The Victorian outages reflected a combination of unusual circumstances, 
including an industrial dispute, which had taken around 20 per cent of generating 
capacity off line, two unplanned generator outages, and an extremely high peak 
demand caused by a heat wave across southeastern Australia. The situation was 
exacerbated by Victorian government intervention to introduce a price cap and 
establish consumption restrictions, which prolonged the shortages and distorted 
market responses…The mandatory consumption restrictions introduced by the 
Victorian government over six days lowered demand in Victoria and had the 
perverse effect of electricity flowing from Victoria into New South Wales and 
South Australia while the restrictions were in place.    
The illustration of NEMMCO’s dispatch and spot pricing methodology highlights the inherent 
volatility of the spot price, which can lead to large variations in financial exposure. This is 
owing to the dependence of the pool process on both generator bidding strategies and the 
impact of the complex interaction of supply and demand factors on pricing.  
 
Description and properties of the data 
 
The data employed in the study are wholesale prices for electricity encompassing the period 
from 1 July 1999 to 30 June 2001. All price data is obtained from the National Electricity 
Market Company (NEMMCO 2002) originally on a half-hourly basis representing 48 trading 
intervals in each 24-hour period. Following Lucia and Schwartz (2001) a series of daily 
arithmetic means is drawn from the trading interval data.  Although such treatment entails the 
loss of at least some ‘news’ impounded in the more frequent trading interval data, daily 
averages play an important role in electricity markets, particularly in the case of financial 
contracts. For example, the NSW and Victorian base and peak load electricity futures 
contracts traded on the Sydney Futures Exchange (SFE) from 1999 to 2002 were settled 
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against the arithmetic mean of half hourly spot prices in a given contract month. Moreover, 
De Vany and Walls (1999a; 1999b) and Robinson (2000) both employ daily spot prices in 
their respective analyses of the western United States and United Kingdom spot electricity 
markets. 
In order to highlight the different price formation processes in the peak and off-peak period 
spot electricity markets, two separate daily average price series are constructed for each 
regional market. The peak period series is formed from the half-hourly trading intervals 
Monday to Friday from 7:00 to 21:00 hours resulting in 522 week day observations. The off-
peak period encompasses the remaining Monday to Friday half-hourly trading intervals along 
with Saturday and Sunday. This results in a longer continuous series of 731 daily 
observations. Categorisation of peak and off-peak (or base load) period prices in this manner 
is identical to that employed in the NEM and as specified in the Sydney Futures Exchange 
Corporation Limited/d-cypha Limited (a subsidiary of Transpower Limited – owner and 
operator of the New Zealand national electricity grid) electricity strips for New South Wales, 
Victoria, Queensland and South Australia.  
<TABLE 3 HERE> 
Table 3 presents the summary of descriptive statistics of the daily peak and off-peak period 
spot prices for the four regional electricity markets. Samples means, medians, maximums, 
minimums, standard deviations, skewness, kurtosis and the Jacque-Bera statistic and p-value 
are reported. Figures 2 and 3 graph the logarithm of the daily peak and off-peak period prices 
over the period selected (all prices in Australian dollars). Within the period examined, the 
highest peak spot prices are in Queensland (QLD) and South Australia (SA) averaging $59.35 
and $81.24 per megawatt-hour respectively. The lowest peak period prices are in New South 
Wales (NSW) and Victoria (VIC) with average spot prices of $41.14 and $47.07 respectively. 
The standard deviations of spot prices range from $49.18 (NSW) to $165.83 (SA). Of the four 
markets, NSW and QLD are the least volatile with standard deviations of $49.18 and $75.55 
respectively, whereas VIC and SA are the most volatile with standard deviations of $94.16 
and $165.83. According to the coefficient of variation, which measures the standard deviation 
relative to the mean, the peak period prices for VIC and SA are more variable than NSW and 
QLD.  
<FIGURE 2 HERE> 
The distributional properties of the spot price series generally appear non-normal. All spot 
electricity prices in the peak period are positively skewed, and with kurtosis exceeding three 
can be represented by a leptokurtic distribution. The calculated Jaque-Bera statistic and 
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corresponding p-value in Table 3 are used to test the null hypothesis that the distribution for 
the daily average peak spot electricity prices is normally distributed. All p-values are smaller 
than the 0.01 level of significance indicating that peak period spot electricity prices cannot be 
approximated by a normal distribution. The off-peak spot prices range from $26.79 (NSW) to 
$40.20 (SA) per megawatt-hour. In general, the off-peak prices are relatively lower than the 
peak prices for each electricity market, and are also less volatile with standard deviations 
ranging from $17.64 (NSW) to $48.60 (VIC). And similarly to peak period prices, the 
distributional properties for all regional markets are non-normal.    
<FIGURE 3 HERE> 
 
Empirical Methodology 
Consider the following random walk with drift process: 
ttt εpp ++= − β1  (1) 
or 
ttt εΔpr +== β  (2) 
where pt is the natural logarithm of the electricity spot price, β is an arbitrary drift parameter, 
rt is the change in electricity prices and εt is a random disturbance term satisfying E(εt) = 0 
and E(εtεt-g) = 0, g ≠ 0, for all t. The random walk hypothesis implies that the residuals are 
both uncorrelated and possess a unit root; thereby providing two alternative testing 
procedures. In the case of the latter, unit root tests focus on establishing whether a series is 
difference stationary or trend stationary. However, it is well known that unit root tests have 
very low power and often fail to detect some departures from random walks (Smith et al. 
2002: 479). An alternative is the variance ratio test that focuses attention on the uncorrelated 
residuals, is widely used for examining the behaviour of series that are not normally 
distributed and is shown to have good size and power properties (Chow and Denning 1993). 
Chow and Denning’s (1993) multiple variance ratio (MVR) procedure detailed below is based 
on Lo and MacKinlay’s (1988) variance ratio test with the size of the test controlled for 
multiple comparisons [for previous applications see Huang (1995), Smith (2002) and Smith et 
al. (2002)].  
As shown by Lo and Mackinlay (1988), the variance ratio statistic is derived from the 
assumption of linear relations in observation interval regarding the variance of increments. If 
a time series follows a random walk process, the variance of a qth-differenced variable is q 
times as large as the first-differenced variable. For a time series partitioned into equally 
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spaced intervals and characterised by random walks, one qth of the variance of (pt - pt-q) is 
expected to be the same as the variance of (pt – pt-1): 
)()( 1−− −=− ttqtt ppqVarppVar  (3) 
where q is any positive integer. The variance ratio is then denoted by: 
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such that under the null hypothesis VR(q) = 1. For a sample size of nq + 1 observations (p0, p1, 
…, pnq), Lo and Mackinlay’s (1988) unbiased estimates of σ2(1) and σ2(q) are 
computationally denoted by: 
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Lo and Mackinlay (1988) produce two test statistics, Z(q) and Z*(q), under the null hypothesis 
of homoskedastic increments random walk and heteoskedastic increments random walk 
respectively. If the null hypothesis is true, the associated test statistic has an asymptotic 
standard normal distribution. With a sample size of nq + 1 observations (p0, p1, …,pnq) and 
under the null hypothesis of homoskedastic increments random walk, the standard normal test 
statistic Z(q) is: 
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The test statistic for a heteoskedastic increments random walk, Z*(q) is: 
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Lo and MacKinlay’s (1988) procedure is devised to test individual variance ratios for a 
specific aggregation interval, q, but the random walk hypothesis requires that VR(q) = 1 for all 
q. Chow and Denning’s (1993) multiple variance ratio (MVR) test generates a procedure for 
the multiple comparison of the set of variance ratio estimates with unity. For a single variance 
ratio test, under the null hypothesis, VR(q) = 1, hence Mr(q) = VR(q) – 1 = 0. Consider a set of 
m variance ratio tests {Mr(qi)⏐i = 1,2,…,m}. Under the random walk null hypothesis, there 
are multiple sub-hypotheses: 
 Hoi: Mr(qi) = 0 for i = 1,2,…,m 
 H1i: Mr(qi) ≠ 0 for any i = 1,2,…,m              (13) 
The rejection of any one or more Hoi rejects the random walk null hypothesis. For a set of test 
statistics, say Z(q), {Z(qi)⏐i = 1,2,…,m}, the random walk null hypothesis is rejected if any 
one of the estimated variance ratio is significantly different from one. Hence only the 
maximum absolute value in the set of test statistics is considered. The core of the Chow and 
Denning’s (1993) MVR test is based on the result: 
( ) αα −≥≤ 1)};;()(,...,)({max 1 TmSMMqZqZPR m  (14) 
where SMM(α;m;T) is the upper α point of the Standardized Maximum Modulus (SMM) 
distribution with parameters m (number of variance ratios) and T (sample size) degrees of 
freedom. Asymptotically when T approaches infinity: 
2/*
);;(lim αα ZmSMMT =∞∞→  (15) 
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2/
)1(1 andon distributi normal standard  where * ααα −−== . Chow and Denning control 
the size of the MVR test by comparing the calculated values of the standardized test statistics, 
either Z(q) or Z*(q) with the SMM critical values. If the maximum absolute value of, say Z(q) 
is greater than the SMM critical value than the random walk hypothesis is rejected. 
Importantly, the rejection of the random walk under homoskedasticity could result from 
either heteroskedasticity and/or autocorrelation in the electricity spot price series. If the 
heteroskedastic random walk is rejected than there is evidence of autocorrelation in the spot 
electricity price series. With the presence of autocorrelation in the price series, the first order 
autocorrelation coefficient can be estimated using the result that )(ˆ qM r is asymptotically 
equal to a weighted sum of autocorrelation coefficient estimates with weights declining 
arithmetically: 
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Empirical Results 
Table 4 presents the results of the multiple variance ratio tests of the four state-based spot 
electricity markets; namely, New South Wales (NSW), Victoria (VIC), Queensland (QLD) 
and South Australia (SA).  Different sampling periods are employed for the peak and off-peak 
period price series that take into the differing structures of the underlying data, i.e. Monday to 
Friday for the peak period (5-day cycle) and Sunday to Saturday for the off-peak period (7-
day cycle). The sampling intervals for the peak period are 2, 5, 10 and 15 days, while the 
sampling intervals for the off-peak period are 2, 7, 14 and 21 days.  
<TABLE 4 HERE> 
For each interval Table 4 presents the estimates of the variance ratio VR(q) and the test 
statistics for the null hypotheses of homoskedastic, Z(q) and heteroskedastic, Z*(q) 
increments random walk. Under the multiple variance ratio procedure, only the maximum 
absolute values of the test statistics are examined. For a sample size of 522 and 731 for the 
peak and off-peak periods respectively and m = 4, the critical value is 2.49 at the 0.05 level of 
significance. For each set of multiple variance ratio tests, an asterisk denotes the maximum 
H. Higgs and A.C. Worthington 14
absolute value of the test statistic that exceeds this critical value and thereby indicates whether 
the null hypothesis of a random walk is rejected. 
Consider the results for NSW in the peak period. The null hypothesis that the natural 
logarithm of the spot electricity price series follows a homoskedastic random walk is rejected 
at Z(5) = 6.0767. Rejection of the null hypothesis of a random walk under homoskedasticity 
for a 5-day period is also a test of the null hypothesis of a homskedastic random walk under 
the alternative sampling periods and we may therefore conclude that NSW peak period spot 
electricity prices do not follow a random walk. However, rejection of the null hypothesis 
under homoskedasticity could result from heteroskedasticity and/or autocorrelation in the 
price series. After allowing for generalized heteroskedasticity, the null hypothesis is also 
rejected at Z*(5) = 3.3552. The heteroskedastic random walk hypothesis is thus rejected 
because of autocorrelation in the daily increments of the natural logarithm of NSW spot 
electricity prices. We may conclude that the NSW peak-period electricity spot market is not 
informationally efficient. 
Further, Lo and Mackinlay (1988) show that for q=2, estimates of the variance ratio minus 
one and the first-order autocorrelation coefficient estimator of daily price changes are 
asymptotically equal. On this basis, the estimated first order autocorrelation coefficient is -
0.1324 corresponding to the estimated variance ratio )2(RˆV  of 0.8676 (i.e. 0.8676 - 1.0000). 
This indicates there is negative autocorrelation in NSW peak-period electricity spot prices. 
Just one implication is that a relatively simple stochastic model incorporating an 
autoregressive process could model the short-term fluctuations in NSW peak period electricity 
prices. Alternatively, had the heteroskedastic random walk hypothesis not been rejected then 
models that take account of varying heteroskedasticity, such as the autoregressive conditional 
heteroskedasticity (ARCH) family of techniques, would be required. 
Similar results are obtained for VIC, QLD and SA in peak period electricity prices. These 
markets all reject both homoskedastic and heteroskedastic increments random walk 
hypotheses because of negative autocorrelation in the series. The estimated first order-
autocorrelation coefficients range from -0.3839 for QLD to -0.5146 for SA. This would 
suggest that a simple first-order autoregressive model used to forecast prices in electricity 
markets could potentially be more accurate for South Australia, followed by Victoria, 
Queensland and New South Wales. 
In the off-peak period, the NSW, QLD and SA markets also reject both homoskedastic and 
heteroskedastic increments random walk hypotheses because of negative autocorrelation in 
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the series. The estimated first order autocorrelation coefficients in this instance are -0.1473 for 
NSW, -0.2637 in Queensland and -0.3123 for South Australia. Once again first-order 
autoregressive modelling techniques may yield useful forecasts of electricity prices, and 
would be relatively more accurate for South Australia than the remaining states. As a rule, the 
autocorrelation coefficients in the off-peak period are lower than in the peak period. More 
interestingly, however, the Victorian off-peak period price series rejects the homoskedastic 
increments random walk hypothesis but fails to reject the heteroskedastic increments random 
walk hypothesis. This could be the result of heteroskedasticity and/or autocorrelation in the 
VIC electricity spot price series. The suggestion is that the Victorian off-peak period 
electricity prices follow a random walk and are therefore informationally efficient. 
The finding that electricity prices in most of the National Electricity Market’s (NEM) 
regional markets do not follow a random walk is not difficult to rationalise. That is, it would 
normally be only in large, institutionally mature, liquid markets that there would be a 
sufficiently active price formation process for the market to follow a random walk. By way of 
contrast, the Australian electricity markets have a very small number of participants that are 
generally able to exert market power and trading rules that may serve to structure price 
formation. For example, the recent ABARE (2002) paper concerning competition in the 
Australian electricity market found that “in the six months examined in 1999, prices were 
considered to have deviated substantially from competitive outcomes for at least two-thirds of 
the period in all states…”. However, the result that Victorian off-peak period electricity prices 
do in fact follow a random walk is more difficult to justify. Certainly, the Victorian market 
was the first to commence competitive trading in 1994 and it benefits from relatively more 
transmission interconnectors than the other regions. Combined together, this would suggest 
that in the off-peak period when transmission constraints are less pronounced that market 
power is constrained and the price formation process more closely approximates a random 
walk.     
 
Concluding Remarks 
 
This paper examines the informational efficiency of four Australian electricity spot markets 
during the period 1999 to 2001. All of these spot markets are member jurisdictions of the 
recently established National Electricity Market (NEM). Multiple variance test statistics with 
both homoskedastic and heteroskedastic variances are used to test for random walks in both 
peak and off-peak period prices. The results indicate that despite the presence of a national 
market for electricity, only the Victorian off-peak period market is informationally efficient. 
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This would suggest, amongst other things, that Australian spot electricity prices could be 
usefully forecasted using autoregressive-modelling techniques, especially in South Australia 
and Queensland. The evidence also provides complementary evidence to the results of studies 
concerned with the economic efficiency of these liberalised markets that generators with 
market power may be sustaining non-competitive outcomes. 
This analysis could be extended in a number of ways. One useful extension would be to 
examine each of the electricity markets individually and in more detail. For example, 
wholesale electricity spot markets in Victoria and New South Wales have existed since 1994 
and 1996 respectively and an examination of the price formation process in these states would 
be particularly useful. Another extension would be to consider market power in an alternative 
form where generators with market power may have an incentive to create volatility in the 
spot market and not just increase prices by withholding capacity or offering higher prices. 
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 Table 1.  Generator offer prices and total electricity demand per half-hour 
Generator 
Generator 
Offer Prices 
(half-hour) 
Time 
Total 
Demand 
(MW) 
6 $40/MWh 12:05pm 290 
5 $38/MWh 12:10pm 330 
4 $37/MWh 12:15pm 360 
3 $35/MWh 12:20pm 410 
2 $33/MWh 12:25pm 440 
1 $32/MWh 12:30pm 390 
 
 
 Table 2. Dispatch of generation and spot price calculation 
Graph point 
price 
Dispatch 
$/MWh 
Time 
demand 
Total 
(MW) Scenario 
Point A 35 12:05pm 290 Generators 1 & 2 are fully utilised. Generator 3 is partially utilised. 
Point B 37 12:10pm 330 Generators 1,2 & 3 are fully utilised. Generator 4 is partially utilised. 
Point C 37 12:15pm 360 Generators 1,2 & 3 are fully utilised. Generator 4 is partially utilised. 
Point D 38 12:20pm 410 Generators 1,2, 3 & 4 are fully utilised. Generator 5 is partially utilised. 
Point E 38 12:25pm 440 Generators 1,2, 3 & 4 are fully utilised. Generator 5 is partially utilised. 
Point F 37 12:30pm 390 Generators 1,2 & 3 are fully utilised. Generator 4 is partially utilised. 
The spot price is calculated as: ($35/MWh + $37/MWh + $37/MWh + $38/MWh + $38/MWh
+ $37/MWh) / 6 = $37/MWh 
 Figure 1. Least cost dispatch and generator utilisation 
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 Figure 2. Graph of logarithm of off-peak spot prices in Australian regional markets, 1999 - 2001 
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 Figure 3. Graph of logarithm of peak spot prices in Australian regional markets, 1999 - 2001 
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 Table 3. Descriptive statistics of peak and off-peak spot prices in Australian regional markets, 1999 - 
2001 
 Peak period prices Off-peak period prices 
Statistics NSW VIC QLD SA NSW VIC QLD SA 
Mean 41.1351 47.0696 59.3459 81.2360 26.7935 27.6042 28.1153 40.1999
Median 30.7717 30.5916 40.5845 49.2485 23.3558 21.0521 22.4447 31.6163
Maximum 585.3686 1658.6050 1078.3920 1880.7390 292.4489 1133.9540 1175.5260 862.1242
Minimum 13.3610 4.2003 16.1152 11.3086 9.6137 6.1663 13.1747 11.8490
Std. Dev. 49.1807 94.1586 75.5536 165.8283 17.6442 48.6029 46.7401 44.8984
Skewness 7.4035 11.8212 7.3861 7.4107 7.9648 18.4743 20.8426 11.3711
Kurtosis 70.0879 178.7824 80.3146 63.4598 104.6152 394.0806 500.9244 177.0935
CV 1.1956 2.0004 1.2731 2.0413 0.6585 1.7607 1.6624 1.1169
J-B 102660 684220 134757 84282 322231 4700002 7604420 938900
J-B p-value 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Observations 522 522 522 522 731 731 731 731
Notes: Prices are in Australian dollars per megawatt-hour; peak period encompasses Mondays to Fridays 
7:00 to 21:00, off-peak period encompasses Monday to Fridays before 7:00 and after 21:00 plus Saturday 
and Sunday, J-B–Jarque-Bera test statistic; NSW–New South Wales, VIC–Victoria, QLD–Queensland, 
SA–South Australia; CV–Coefficient of variation.  
 
 Table 4. Multiple variance ratio tests for peak and off-peak spot prices in Australian regional markets, 
1999-2001 
Region Statistics Peak period prices Off-peak period prices 
  q = 2 q = 5 q =10 q = 15 q = 2 q = 7 q =14 q = 21 
NSW VR(q) 0.8676 0.4167 0.2566 0.1840 0.8527 0.3064 0.1816 0.1554
 Z(q) 3.0214 *6.0767 5.0258 4.3844 3.9810 *6.8753 5.4087 4.4726
 Z*(q) 1.4648 *3.3552 3.0128 2.7547 1.4335 *2.9546 2.8913 2.7127
VIC VR(q) 0.5022 0.2854 0.1569 0.1179 0.9295 0.3217 0.1814 0.1468
 Z(q) *11.3628 7.4452 5.6994 4.7398 1.9050 *6.7239 5.4100 4.5179
 Z*(q) *4.5334 3.5833 3.1862 2.8979 1.0475 2.2205 2.1888 2.0752
QLD VR(q) 0.6161 0.2997 0.1280 0.1054 0.7363 0.2577 0.1619 0.1200
 Z(q) *8.7636 7.2958 5.8948 4.8069 7.1250 *7.3588 5.5387 4.6602
 Z*(q) *5.4688 5.2875 4.7609 4.0938 2.3125 *3.0355 2.7272 2.5687
SA VR(q) 0.4854 0.2461 0.1162 0.0802 0.6877 0.2302 0.1077 0.0808
 Z(q) *11.7455 7.8545 5.9748 4.9424 *8.4371 7.6313 5.8972 4.8677
 Z*(q) *5.4337 4.3054 3.7847 3.4311 3.6715 *3.8902 3.6411 3.3301
Notes: Peak period encompasses Mondays to Fridays 7:00 to 21:00, off-peak period encompasses 
Monday to Fridays before 7:00 and after 21:00 plus Saturday and Sunday; NSW–New South Wales, 
VIC–Victoria, QLD–Queensland, SA–South Australia; VR(q) – variance ratio estimate, Z(q) - test 
statistic for null hypothesis of homoskedastic increments random walk, Z* (q) - test statistic for null 
hypothesis of heteroskedastic increments random walk; the critical value for Z(q) and Z*(q) at the 5 
percent level of significance is 2.49, asterisk indicates significance at this level; Sampling intervals (q) 
are in days. 
 
